Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist? by Reuter, Dean et al.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 4 Fall 2020 Article 7 
3-22-2021 
Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist? 
Dean Reuter 
Thomas Hardiman 
Amy Coney Barrett 
Michael C. Dorf 
Saikrishna B. Prakash 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dean Reuter, Thomas Hardiman, Amy C. Barrett, Michael C. Dorf, Saikrishna B. Prakash & Richard H. 
Pildes, Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?, 69 Cath. U. L. Rev. 683 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss4/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist? 
Authors 
Dean Reuter, Thomas Hardiman, Amy Coney Barrett, Michael C. Dorf, Saikrishna B. Prakash, and Richard 
H. Pildes 
This symposium is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss4/7 
 
683 
The Federalist Society Presents: 
SHOWCASE PANEL II:  
WHY, OR WHY NOT, BE AN ORIGINALIST?+ 
With an Introduction by Dean Reuter, Esq. 
 
 
November 15, 2019 
National Lawyers Convention 





HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit 
 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF 
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School 
 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH 
James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Paul G. Mahoney Research 
Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law 
 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES 
Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University Law 
School 
 
MODERATOR: HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
  
                                                 
 + On November 15, 2019, the Federalist Society hosted the second showcase panel of the 2019 
National Lawyers Convention at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC.  The topic of the panel 
was “Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?”  There are a variety of arguments for following 
originalism today, such as justifications rooted in language, positivism, sovereignty, and 
consequences.  This panel would look at many normative positions for and against originalism. 
 1. Please note that the Speakers have reviewed and edited this Transcript. 
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TRANSCRIPT 
DEAN REUTER: Good morning.  Let’s get started if we could.  Thank you 
very much.  I’m Dean Reuter, Vice President, General Counsel, and Director of 
Practice Groups at The Federalist Society.  Welcome and thank you all.  
Welcome back, or welcome, as the case may be.  This is the second and best day 
of The Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, so thank you for being 
here.  This is our showcase panel on “Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?”  
And as Justice Kagan has said, and as we heard again last night, we’re all 
originalists now.2  So one could wonder, if we’re all originalists, why do we 
have a panel on or why or why not be an originalist?  I’m interested to find that 
out myself, so we’ll find out momentarily. 
But I thought we had a great day yesterday, capped last night by what I thought 
was a very personal and touching address by Justice Kavanagh, just splendid.  
And I don’t think people in this room necessarily know, but that event was sold 
out before we could advertise it.  So it’s a good time to be in The Federalist 
Society.  And I apologize for the delay in getting into the room last night, into 
the building.  That was caused by a last minute security, a second security sweep 
of the entire building.  It turns out a security sweep that was almost perfect but 
not quite perfect, as we did have one protestor in the room. 
So the good news is that that protestor last night, if you were there—who tried 
to interrupt the proceedings—she apparently did pay for her dinner ticket. 
[Laughter] 
Someone suggested it might be nice for us to take that money and do 
something meaningful or useful with it.  We charged $250 for dinner last night 
for nonmembers, and I’m pretty confident she was not a member.  So you all 
know me.  If you have a great idea of how The Federalist Society should spend 
that $250, let me know.  I was thinking staff bonuses, but you might have better 
ideas. 
[Laughter] 
In terms of special things going on today, there’s an exhibit today upstairs in 
the Rhode Island Room of one of the original copies of The Federalist Papers.  
If you get a chance, you should really take a look.  It’s going to be on display 
tomorrow as well, but only part of the day tomorrow.  So that’s the Rhode Island 
Room upstairs.  We’ve got more book signings today as well—but please don’t 
sign the Federalist Papers upstairs—several panel discussions, and an address, 
of course, by Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia.  And then we’ll end the day with 
an address by Bill Barr, the Olson Lecture. 
One thing we’ve added this year—actually, we had it last year—is the 
livestream of all of our proceedings, virtually all the proceedings.  So I would 
encourage folks to email and tweet your friends and family, let them know they 
                                                 
 2. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of 
Elena Kagan, Nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States). 
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can watch all these proceedings online.  Just go to The Federalist Society 
website, fedsoc.org. 
With that, it becomes my duty to introduce our moderator, Judge Hardiman.  
I’ve urged all our moderators to introduce their panelists very briefly, so I’m 
going to introduce him only briefly by saying he’s a great friend of the 
organization, a repeat performer here.  And I welcome him.  Please join me in 
welcoming Judge Tom Hardiman. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Thank you, Dean.  It is a great privilege for 
me to be here to moderate this panel of outstanding thinkers and scholars.  Our 
first presenter this morning will be the Honorable Amy Coney Barrett.  She has 
served as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
for the past two years.  She spent some time here in Washington serving as a law 
clerk to Judge Laurence Silberman and Justice Antonin Scalia.  She also 
practiced law at Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin for three years before 
returning to a place that is near and dear to my heart, the University of Notre 
Dame.  In 2002, Judge Barrett returned to her alma mater, where she became a 
distinguished professor of law.  In addition to her extensive duties on the Seventh 
Circuit, she continues to teach at Notre Dame. 
After Judge Barrett, we’re going to hear from Professor Richard Pildes.  He’s 
the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at NYU Law School.  He’s 
one of the nation’s leading scholars of constitutional law and a specialist in legal 
issues concerning democracy.  A former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
Professor Pildes has been elected into the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences and the American Law Institute.  He also received recognition as a 
Guggenheim Fellow and a Carnegie Scholar.  Professor Pildes authored an 
acclaimed casebook on The Law of Democracy.3  And we’ll hear more from 
Professor Pildes about the law of democracy during his remarks. 
Our third presenter will be Professor Sai Prakash.  He’s the James Monroe 
Distinguished Professor of Law and the Paul G. Mahoney Research Professor of 
Law at the University of Virginia Law School.  A graduate of Stanford 
University and Yale Law School, Professor Prakash clerked for, like Judge 
Barrett, Judge Laurence Silberman here in Washington.  And he also clerked for 
Justice Clarence Thomas.  A widely respected scholar of the separation of 
powers in general and executive power in particular, Professor Prakash’s 
forthcoming book, The Living Presidency: An Originalist Argument Against Its 
Ever-Expanding Powers, will be published by Harvard University Press next 
year.4 
Last, but certainly not least, Professor Michael Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens 
Professor of Law at Cornell Law School where he has taught since 2008.  A 
                                                 
 3. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN, RICHARD PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY, 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5th ed. 2016). 
 4. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN ORIGINALIST 
ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EVER-EXPANDING POWERS (2020). 
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prolific author of more than 100 articles and essays, Professor Dorf is co-author 
with Professor Laurence Tribe of On Reading the Constitution.5  A graduate of 
Harvard College and Harvard Law School, Professor Dorf clerked on the Ninth 
Circuit for Judge Stephen Reinhardt and on the Supreme Court for Justice 
Anthony Kennedy. 
In the grand tradition of The Federalist Society, we will have opening 
statements of approximately ten minutes from each of our panelists, followed by 
diverse opinions and vigorous discussion.  We will conclude with questions, I 
reiterate, questions, from the audience at the tail end of the presentation.  So 
without further ado, Judge Amy Barrett. 
[Applause] 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Thank you, Judge Hardiman.  I’m 
delighted to be at the convention and on this panel this morning.  I look forward 
to a lively debate. 
At bottom, I think one ought to be an originalist because the Constitution, no 
less than a statute, is law.  It’s not merely a statement of our aspirations, as some 
have described it, nor, as others have said, is it simply a symbol of our political 
culture’s commitment to the idea of fundamental rights.  Those things are true 
of the Declaration of Independence, a document that we revere.  But the 
Declaration does not bind us, and the Constitution does.  It’s more than an 
expression of political ideals.  It has the force of law. 
Why is the Constitution law?  As an initial matter, the original Constitution, 
along with each of its amendments, was adopted in an exercise of popular 
sovereignty through a process self-consciously designed to create authoritative 
law.  And the authoritative law that the people created is the text that they 
ratified.  That text is what satisfied the onerous process of ratification.  That is 
what has supermajority buy-in.  And if a constitutional provision became 
authoritative because the people consented to it, then we need to know what they 
consented to.  And to discern that, we look at the meaning that the text had at 
the time it was drafted and ratified. 
Two features of our Constitution make that possible.  The fact that it is written 
enables us to identify the content of our constitutional commitments, and the fact 
that the Constitution and its amendments become authoritative through a formal 
process enables us to put the text in its historical context.  The same isn’t true of 
an unwritten constitution, for example, like the British Constitution.  If 
fundamental law grows through a largely unwritten tradition, it is difficult to pin 
down its precise content, much less to isolate the moment at which any given 
principle becomes fundamental law. 
Our Constitution is structured differently.  Its meaning was fixed at the time 
it was written and formally adopted, and it stays the same until it is lawfully 
changed.  And this fixation of the text is part of our constitutional design because 
it sharpens the constraint.  The content of the commitment does not change even 
                                                 
 5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991). 
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if popular attitudes wax and wane.  Even if a majority of the country thinks that 
free speech is passé, the First Amendment stands. 
Arguments that the text is authoritative raise a number of objections, but a 
common one is the dead hand objection.  We were not among the people who 
ratified any of these constitutional provisions, nor, when some of these 
constitutional provisions were ratified, would many of us have been able to 
participate in their ratification.  So why should we be bound to the text as those 
who ratified it understood it? 
This is more than an objection to originalism. It’s an objection to the 
Constitution’s status as law.  On this view, the Constitution has no claim on us 
because we didn’t participate in the process of its adoption.  But this idea doesn’t 
really have purchase in real life.  For example, we’ve recently seen criticisms of 
the Electoral College and of equal representation in the Senate.  But we don’t 
see serious proposals to simply abandon the Electoral College in the next 
election or to seat more than two senators from California. 
We wouldn’t make either change without a constitutional amendment 
because, in our ongoing society, each generation treats the law as authoritative 
until it is lawfully changed.  And the constitutional law that is handed down is—
I’m going to borrow this from Professor Stephen Sachs—the founder’s law plus 
lawful changes.6  To figure out what the law is, we go to the source.  We identify 
the meaning of the text that the people ratified and account for any lawful 
changes that have happened since. 
Now, it’s indisputably true that a constitutional change is hard to come by.  
The hurdles of the Article V process are steep.  Does the difficulty of that process 
mean that we’re stuck with the Founders’ law, no matter how much we might 
want to change it?  Or, put differently, is the Constitution a straitjacket?  No.  
For one thing, it bears emphasis that the Constitution itself leaves plenty of room 
for change, political, legal, social, and otherwise.  The Constitution is less than 
6,000 words, and it makes no attempt to regulate every aspect of American life.  
It leaves change largely in the hands of the states and of the political branches 
of the federal government. 
The Constitution may be hard to amend, but legislation is easier to pass.  And 
state constitutions are much easier to amend than our federal Constitution.  As 
Judge Sutton has reminded us, we have 51 imperfect solutions, not one.7  Our 
Constitution is not supposed to be the mechanism by which we accomplish every 
change, even significant ones. 
Moreover, when the Constitution does speak, it does so through a mix of rules 
and standards.  That has given the Constitution the flexibility to last.  It speaks 
not only in specifics but also in generalities.  And fidelity to the Constitution 
                                                 
 6. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
817, 819 (2015). 
 7. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018). 
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means respecting the level of generality at which the text is written, not to 
transform standards into rules or vice versa.  As Justice Scalia said, text should 
not be construed strictly.8  It should not be construed leniently.  It should be 
construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means. 
Now, notwithstanding the ways in which the Constitution leaves us flexibility, 
there is no denying that it also imposes constraints.  After all, entrenching certain 
values and structural features of government is the point.  Is that reason to say 
that we ought not be bound by this law, including by the mechanisms that it 
proscribes for change?  Again, no. 
The difficulty of constitutional amendment is, in my view, one of the things 
that enables us to hang together as a country.  Amending the Constitution is 
difficult not simply because Article V makes it so.  It’s because the size and 
diversity of our country makes supermajority buy-in very difficult to achieve.  
But perhaps that’s okay.  Having fewer, rather than more, national and 
entrenched rules, thereby permitting regional differences to flourish, is 
necessary in a country like ours.  It’s remarkable, really, that the people of 
Louisiana and California, of New York and New Mexico are able to live under 
one constitutional roof. 
We compare ourselves to Western European countries.  But consider that 
Germany, closest to us in size, is roughly 138,000 square miles and has a 
population of roughly 83 million.  The United States has a population of roughly 
330 million and is roughly 3.8 million square miles.  While I haven’t looked at 
the statistics, I think it’s a pretty safe bet that we have more racial, cultural, and 
religious diversity than any of our Western European peers or our Canadian 
neighbors.  The Constitution that we have may not be the one that we would 
adopt if we started from scratch with our own constitutional convention today.  
Then again, I’m skeptical that we would be able to agree on any constitution at 
all today.  But we do agree on the one that we have, as reflected by our continued 
acceptance of it. 
We treat our original Constitution as law, and we are right to do so.  If we 
abandon it, if judges or elected officials seize the authority to change it outside 
of the lawfully proscribed process, then we’re imposing constraints on the 
People to which they have not consented.  And I think that undermines the ability 
of the citizens of our very large and diverse country to live peaceably together 
under one constitutional roof. 
I’ll sum up by saying this: in keeping with the theme of “we’re all originalists 
now,” the really interesting questions involve the mechanisms for lawful 
constitutional change, not whether the Constitution binds.  Identifying the level 
of generality at which provisions are written, analyzing the authority of 
precedent, and determining how one builds out the more general language of the 
                                                 
 8. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 
(1997). 
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Constitution are all areas in which a lot of fruitful debate is occurring.  Thank 
you. 
[Applause] 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Up until now, I have largely avoided getting 
caught in the crossfire of the debates between originalists and non-originalists.  
In my academic work, I haven’t engaged extensively with the debates over the 
proper method or methods of interpreting the Constitution.  But now that this 
event thrusts me onto that battlefield, maybe I can add a bit of a different 
perspective to these debates by engaging them from a somewhat different 
perspective, which as Judge Hardiman said, is the perspective of the substantive 
body of law much of my work addresses—the body of law I call the “law of 
democracy.” 
Starting from a focus on the law of democracy, I want to raise the particular 
question, for those who are originalists, whether originalism should be 
understood as a complete theory of constitutional interpretation or only a partial 
theory.  More specifically, are there some domains of law that even originalists 
do recognize or should recognize that are not and should not be governed by 
originalism—that are, in fact, legitimately even anti-originalist?  Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, I want to suggest one of those domains is the law of 
democracy.  This body of law is probably the most radically non-originalist body 
of constitutional law that we have.  It’s been deeply established for 50 years or 
so now.  Much of this law is widely accepted and not controversial, although 
some aspects of it, of course, are. 
Here is a list of just four of the fundamental building blocks of the law of 
democracy, just to ensure that everyone knows what constitutional doctrines I’m 
talking about.  First, there is the Court’s recognition of the right to vote as a 
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause, although this could easily 
also be called an application of substantive due process.9  Second is the Court’s 
recognition that grossly malapportioned legislative districts violate Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment—that is the 
establishment of the one-person, one-vote principle.10 
Third, there is the body of constitutional law that strikes down, under the First 
Amendment, ballot access laws that make it unjustifiably difficult for third 
parties or independent candidates to get onto the ballot—the doctrine that John 
McCain benefited from when he challenged George Bush in the 2000 election 
primary because New York law for decades had made it virtually impossible in 
the Republican presidential primary for anyone other than the candidate the 
party establishment had anointed even to get on the primary ballot.11  Fourth, 
there is the corpus of constitutional law that recognizes that political parties have 
constitutional rights that prohibit states from allowing, for example, independent 
                                                 
 9. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–68 (1964). 
 11. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968). 
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voters to vote in a party’s primary, even though the states can impose a primary 
on the parties in the first place.12 
I can’t explain in detail here why all of these doctrines are so dramatically 
non-originalist.  Nor have I included in this list of four central, non-originalist 
areas of the law of democracy other constitutional doctrines in this area that 
some would argue (while some would not) are more closely tied to the specific 
text of the constitution, such as constitutional law decisions involving campaign 
finance, racial vote dilution, or racial gerrymandering.  I want to focus just on 
key doctrines in this area that pose the most direct challenge to originalism.  And 
with respect to the four areas I’ve mentioned—constitutional protection of the 
vote or access to the ballot box or the design of legislative districts or the role of 
political parties—it is simply not easy to square any of these with the text of the 
Constitution or with any version of originalism (whether that originalism focuses 
on public understandings at the time the relevant constitutional provisions were 
enacted, the expected application of those provisions, or original intent 
understood more narrowly).  Indeed it’s not even easy for non-originalists to 
square this body of law with interpretive approaches based on the evolving 
historical practices of American democracy.  These lines of constitutional 
development were more radical even than that. 
The underlying reason it is difficult to square this body of law with originalism 
or even some non-originalist approaches to interpretation stems from one of the 
paradoxes of our Constitution.  The paradox is that, precisely because we are the 
oldest continuous constitutional democracy, the Constitution itself is remarkably 
thin and underdeveloped when it comes to much of how the democratic process 
and the frameworks for elections should be constructed.  Many reasons exist for 
that, including that the Framers could not anticipate certain aspects of how 
democracy would develop.  More modern constitutions frequently spell out in 
detail issues concerning individual political rights, or the rights of political 
parties, or the institutions that oversee the democratic process (such as 
independent electoral commissions).  But the text of our Constitution contains 
much less than most Americans realize with respect to the basic rights and 
structures of democratic process. 
Most historians agree, for example, that the glorious Fourteenth Amendment, 
for example, was not intended, or publicly understood, to include political rights.  
Similarly, modern issues the Framers could not have anticipated did not even 
arise until far later in our history.  Constitutional issues concerning state 
regulation of the ballot couldn’t even arise, for example, until the states began 
to take over the process of printing an official state ballot, which didn’t happen 
until the rise of the secret ballot in the 1890s.  Once the state took over that 
function, state regulation over access to the ballot inevitably followed, along 
with concerns about state actors using that control for their own partisan 
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advantage—which, in turn, generated questions about whether constitutional 
doctrine had anything to say about this risk.  Political parties were thought to be 
anathema to the system the Constitution was designed to set up, the 
quintessential form of Federalist No. 10’s faction.13  Yet, by the time of World 
War II, almost all the new constitutions came to protect the rights of political 
parties as one of the foundational principles of democracy; in the aftermath of 
one party totalitarian states, two or more political parties competing for power 
came to be understood as almost definitional of democracy—despite our 
constitution not saying anything about political parties. 
Moreover, much of the law of democracy, which began to be created in the 
early 1960s, was born directly in the teeth of contrary constitutional text, or at 
least so a textualist or an originalist might argue.  The Elections Clause in Article 
I, for example, gives Congress the power to regulate how congressional districts 
are drawn.14  Thus, the text of the Constitution expressly empowered Congress 
to end the massive malapportionment of congressional districts.  That textual 
grant of power to Congress played a role in the Court’s decisions, for many 
decades, to treat malapportionment as a political issue, not appropriate for 
judicial resolution. 
But eventually, the Court learned something that the Framers couldn’t have 
known.  With the rise of political parties, members of Congress and state 
legislators would come to share common political interests, common incentives, 
and common fates.  As a result, the vision that Congress would stand above and 
independent of state legislative politics and serve as an effective institutional 
check on practices like state-legislative manipulation of the way districts are 
designed become unrealistic.  One way of understanding the one-person, one-
vote doctrine that eventually emerged is that, once it became more clear how our 
political institutions functioned after political parties became established, the 
Court concluded that constitutional law needed to assume the role that congress 
would not in ensuring that the way election districts are drawn does not 
undermine a fundamentally fair and equal political process. 
What should we call the approach to constitutional interpretation that justifies 
the doctrines I’ve briefly described here, along with the rest of the law of 
democracy?  To offer a brief, single sentence answer to that I turn to none other 
than Justice Scalia, who once wrote, “The first instinct of power is the retention 
of power . . . .”15  That highly pragmatic, functional statement—surprising, 
perhaps, from Justice Scalia—was offered to explain his then-dissenting view 
that the Court should strike down a campaign finance law.  More generally, that 
statement suggests that one of the primary functions of judicial review is 
precisely to provide a check against letting “the instinct to retain power” be 
turned into legislation. 
                                                 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 15. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Let me elaborate on Justice Scalia’s point.  As a general matter, we know that 
in any democratic system those who temporarily gain power will be tempted to 
leverage that power into more enduring forms, through policies that entrench 
themselves and their allies more securely in control.  Those efforts might entail 
using legislation to reduce competitive threats from opposition parties or using 
temporary power to undermine the other checks and balances meant to hold 
political power accountable. 
If we had grown complacent about that threat, we just have to look at the rise 
in formerly democratic countries today, for example, in Hungary and Poland, of 
what’s been called electoral authoritarianism: governments that continue to hold 
competitive elections, or at least nominally competitive elections, in order to get 
legitimation from the political process, but use their power in office to capture 
control of the courts, the media, and of the electoral process itself through 
gerrymandering election districts and other structural manipulations that create 
significant hurdles to meaningful political opposition. 
This risk of political self-entrenchment that insiders will rig the system for 
their own benefit is one all democracies face.  We know that.  That makes quite 
powerful an understanding of judicial review that sees one of its most important 
functions of judicial review to be the protection of democratic self-government 
against these always-present risks, which cannot easily be protected against from 
within the democratic process itself. 
Is this a matter of constitutional interpretation?  Shall we call this a 
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, à la John Ely, or an 
approach based on the Constitution’s underlying structures and relationships, à 
la Professor Charles Black?  Perhaps.  But, rather than a matter of what might 
be called interpretation, maybe this is even better understood as a matter of 
applying principles constitutive of the very idea of government by consent that 
we understand underwrites the Constitution as a whole: the idea that the coercive 
power of the state is legitimate only when it arises through processes of political 
competition not distorted through these kinds of manipulations of that process 
by incumbent political forces. 
Let me conclude by asking how originalist constitutional theory deals with 
this major, but non-originalist, body of law?  Others here can answer that perhaps 
better than me.  In general, I do not think that originalists have grappled much 
yet with the law of democracy as a body of law—I don’t think non-originalists 
have done enough of that either.  But here are three option I can briefly identify 
in the work of some non-originalists. 
The first is flat out rejection: for originalists to deny the legitimacy of most or 
all of the law of democracy.  That is the approach Robert Bork appears to have 
taken in The Tempting of America, but he only spends a couple of sentences on 
this area of law.16 
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The second option is a kind of partial accommodation, coming up with heroic 
interpretations of the text to accommodate at least some of this body of law.  
That’s what one of our best originalists, my friend Professor Michael 
McConnell, has done to justify the Court taking on the issue of 
malapportionment.  He argues that the Republican Form of Government Clause 
should be understood to bar the kind of malapportionment that existed before 
the Court stepped in.17  But even that approach, which is designed to protect 
effective majority rule, as he says, only deals with one aspect of the general 
problem of self-entrenchment and not with the full range of anticompetitive laws 
courts have struck down in the name of the First Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment to preserve the processes of democratic competition. 
A third option for originalists is the one I suggested at the beginning: to accept 
that at least some domains of our most important constitutional law are 
legitimately not originalist or even anti-originalist.  It is a simple reality of 
democratic politics everywhere that a major risk to democratic self-government 
is that those with power will use it to entrench themselves more deeply in power, 
and, for that reason, one of the primary needs and justifications for 
constitutionalism itself, and judicial review, is to protect the democratic process 
against that risk. 
Of course, even if this non-originalist justification is persuasive as a general 
matter, we will still disagree in practice about how to apply judicial review in 
concrete cases involving the democratic process.  But unless originalists are 
prepared to shut the door completely for any such role for the courts, we should 
at least acknowledge some role for a non-originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  Thank you. 
[Applause] 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Well, it’s an absolute pleasure to be 
here today.  I’m very impressed with the size of the audience, and I’m honored 
to be with these wonderful speakers.  I can see many people in the audience that 
know about as much about originalism as I do. 
The topic today is, “Why, or Why Not, be an Originalist?”  And it’s an odd 
question to me because it’s a bit like asking why or why not be a human.  I think 
originalism—this is my first point—originalism is the natural way of 
understanding utterances.  I think Richard Fallon in his book, Implementing the 
Constitution, writes that most of his students come to Harvard Law as 
originalists.18  They try to understand what the law makers are trying to enact.  
And he says most people are originalist.  And I don’t know what happens to 
those students once they leave Harvard Law School, but they came with the right 
instinct.  I was an originalist before I went to law school, before I went to college.  
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You try to understand people’s utterances.  You try to understand what they’re 
trying to convey. 
Law making is a form of communication.  We’re trying to discern what the 
law-maker’s trying to provide.  If we’re honest with ourselves, we don’t try to 
invest what meanings we prefer.  Parents give instructions to children.  If 
children are manipulating the meaning of those instructions to serve their own 
ends, they’re not really trying to understand what the parents are saying.  That’s 
not true interpretation.  So I think Fallon is right.  It’s the natural way of 
understanding utterances.  It’s the natural way of understanding 
communications.  It’s the natural way of understanding law, as well. 
And I think we can see this today.  If you are fortunate enough to watch the 
impeachment hearings, you will hear ad nauseum hundreds, if not thousands, of 
times over the next several months “What did the Founders think about 
impeachment?”  Half of the Congress will say the Founders would have wanted 
Donald Trump to be impeached because he’s committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors.  They’ll quote Article II, Section 4, which talks about “shall be” 
impeached for the following high crimes and misdemeanors.19  And if you’re a 
Republican, you’ll talk about perhaps the Founders rolling over in their graves.  
This is not an impeachable offense, they will argue.  But I’m not interested in 
the specifics of the arguments. 
My point is they’re both making this argument because it is precisely what 
people expect.  If a member of Congress goes up there and says, “We don’t really 
care what this clause was meant to do.  We just want to get rid of the President, 
or we just want to save the President, come what may,” that’s just not a 
legitimate argument in Congress, I don’t think, certainly not at this point.  And 
these sorts of arguments are going to be made because people expect to hear 
them.  In my view, the marks on a page, the utterances that people make are not 
an invitation to readers or to listeners to generate meanings that are at variance 
with what the speaker was trying to convey or what a reasonable reader would 
take the text to mean. 
My second point is that originalism is not about whether we should honor 
some meaning.  I think I perhaps disagree with Judge Barrett, with all due 
respect.  I think meaning is different and separate from decisions to act, to honor, 
and to be bound by.  In other words, saying what some text means does not 
establish that we ought to abide by whatever injunction, cautions, and warnings 
are in the text. 
Using originalism, I can tell you what the Articles of Confederation mean.  
That’s not a reason for us to follow the Articles of Confederation.  I can tell you 
about the 1788 Treaty of Alliance with France.  That treaty is defunct, declared 
by Congress as such during the quasi-war with France.20  A Canadian using 
originalism can understand our Constitution.  Obviously, the Canadian does not 
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need to follow our Constitution or feel any allegiance to it.  When talking about 
some defunct law or expired law, I think we understand this.  Not much turns on 
the Fugitive Slave Clause.  We can still figure out what it means.  Not much 
turns on it because of the Thirteenth Amendment.21 
So in my view, originalism properly understood is not a normative theory.  It’s 
a theory of interpretation about what something means.  I think I’ve gotten this 
notion from Randy Barnett and Gary Lawson.  It’s not a theory of normativity.  
It’s a theory of what something means.  And you need something else to decide 
what to do with what the text means.  So whether we should honor something 
requires a normative theory. 
Let me unpack that.  Some people say that we should follow the Constitution 
because it was adopted by means of popular sovereignty.  I think Judge Barrett 
said that, and other people have eloquently also made that sort of argument.  But 
I don’t think that follows.  If the question is, “What does the Constitution 
mean?”—I don’t think it follows that we should be originalists because it was 
adopted by means of popular sovereignty. 
It seems to me someone can be an originalist, someone can try to make sense 
of a text, whether or not they agree with popular sovereignty.  There will be 
some people, call them libertarians, who may blanche at what comes through or 
what emerges from a process reflecting popular sovereignty.  And there’ll be 
other people who have different points of view.  So I think one can be an 
originalist.  One can be a believer in popular sovereignty. 
One can also reject this Constitution on the grounds that it’s no longer a 
reflection of the popular sovereignty of today.  One can take the Jeffersonian 
position that the Earth belongs to the living and that the past shouldn’t be able 
to control the present, certainly not the past of 200 years ago.  I agree with Judge 
Barrett.  It’s often said of originalism that it allows the past to control the present.  
It really doesn’t.  It’s a mode of interpretation.  Whether you choose to be bound 
by the past is up to you.  It’s not ascribable to the theory of interpretation. 
So again, if what I’ve said is true, originalism is a theory of interpretation.  It’s 
not a normative theory.  And this takes me to my last point.  I think the last point 
reflects the curious position we’re in.  Everyone in this country wants to say that 
they subscribe to the Constitution, they believe in the Constitution.  Then the 
fight is, well, what do we make of it?   I think originalists have on their side this 
intuition that the meaning of the Constitution ought to be understood by 
reference to what it meant in 1789, because, again, I think that’s the natural way 
of understanding words. 
And people that believe in change on and change in the Constitution on a more 
progressive vision of the Constitution, they have cases and doctrines that many 
people actually like.  There’s a good portion of the country that likes much of 
what the Warren Court did.  There’s a good portion of the country that likes 
some of the things that the more recent Court has done.  And they’re able to 
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point to those things.  Professor Pildes just did that.  They’re able to point to 
those things and say, “If you’re an originalist, you have to reject all these things.” 
So what we see is a struggle, I think, over how to make sense of the words of 
the Constitution to account for both of these impulses.  And I think the 
originalists have the idea that originalism is the natural way of understanding the 
Constitution.  And living constitutionalists have in their corner the idea that there 
are many innovations in constitutional law that people favor.  Many people 
would favor some of the innovations that Professor Pildes mentioned earlier. 
Let me end with two points.  First, Justice Scalia wrote a wonderful article 
called “Originalism: The Necessary Evil.”22  And I commend it to you.  I think 
the Justice was wrong.  It’s not an evil at all.  Interpretation is not evil.  What 
you do with a clause may or may not be evil.  So the Fugitive Slave Clause has 
a meaning.  The Clause itself is evil, but the act of interpreting it is not.  So I 
think it was a mistake to talk about it as an evil.  I think what he was trying to 
suggest was, as compared to other ways of deciding cases or deciding meaning, 
it’s less evil.  But I don’t know why you would call originalism evil any more 
than you would call interpretation evil.  I don’t understand that. 
And my second point is to end with a hypothetical.  Suppose you’ve got a 
grandfather on his deathbed, and he whispers to you, “Stay off the grass.”  And 
you promise to abide by his injunction.  He smiles.  He seems relieved, and he 
passes.  You know precisely what he means, what he meant to say.  He was a 
drug addict during the ‘70s, and he is telling you to stay off marijuana.  But you 
like to smoke marijuana.  So you instead understand that command and your 
faithfulness to it as a requirement that you stay off grass.  You don’t play football 
on grass.  You play it only on artificial turf.  You always use the concrete 
pathways.  You’re not really honoring your grandfather’s wishes, and you 
should just give up the game.  If you don’t want to honor it, don’t pretend that 
your misinterpretation is what he was trying to convey. 
To be clear, I’m not here to sermonize against marijuana.  I’ve never inhaled.  
I’m like the former President.  But my point is it’s a mistake to misinterpret the 
Constitution to achieve some end.  Professor Pildes’ point, I think, is well-taken.  
If you wish to pursue other ends, if you wish to salvage some portions of the 
Court’s jurisprudence that you favor, you’re going to have to use something 
other than originalism.  Our jurisprudence is awash with non-originalist 
doctrines.  So thank you so much. 
[Applause] 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I want to begin by thanking The Federalist 
Society, Judge Hardiman for moderating, my fellow panelists, and all of you for 
coming out here today. 
My position on the question why or why not to be an originalist is first we 
need to figure out what exactly it is we mean by originalism because, by my 
count, there are originalisms, not a single originalism.  I want to talk in particular 
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about two lines of cleavage that one can see in the historical evolution of 
originalism from its, if you will, original instantiation. 
The idea that the original understanding of the words of the Constitution is 
very important in constitutional interpretation is not originalism.  That’s an idea 
that is accepted across the jurisprudential ideological spectrum.  What makes 
originalism distinctive, it’s sometimes said, is the notion that those words are 
determinative of the results in concrete cases. 
But if you dig into that claim a little bit, however, you’ll see, that it can’t be 
right for at least two reasons.  One reason is that all originalists accept some 
version of stare decisis.  Even Justice Thomas, who is the Justice least 
committed to precedent in the face of contrary evidence of the original 
understanding, believes that precedent has some weight.  More broadly, any 
acceptance of stare decisis entails that sometimes a judge or justice will accept 
a case as precedential even though it is inconsistent with the original 
understanding.  So then you need a further theory of when to be an originalist 
and when to be somebody who, on prudential and pragmatic grounds, accepts 
stare decisis. 
The other reason to question originalism, understood as the claim that the 
original understanding should be dispositive rather than just important, is that 
the original understanding is often quite underdeterminate.  Not always, of 
course.  Often it’s determinate.  Judge Barrett gave a number of examples: two 
senators per state.  That’s pretty fully determinate.  But there are all sorts of other 
questions in which the original understanding of the text is underdeterminate.  
Thus, even originalists are not going to be deciding cases simply in virtue of the 
original understanding in all cases.  So the proposition that what distinguishes 
originalists from non-originalists is that originalists always follow the original 
understanding, whereas non-originalists just think it’s relevant, doesn’t quite 
work. 
If originalism is not the view that judges should always accept the original 
understanding as determinative, what is it?  What makes originalism distinctive?  
My view is that originalism is an ism.  It’s an ideology.  And to understand an 
ideology, it’s helpful to think about where it came from.  You can find numerous 
statements in Supreme Court and lower court cases, and the treatises of opinion 
writers throughout the nineteenth century into the twentieth century, talking 
about the importance of original understanding, usually in terms of original 
intent.  To be sure, those uses sometimes meant by intent something different 
from the subjective intensions and expectations of the Founders; they meant 
something more like what we would call objective purpose. 
In any event, even putting aside the difference between subjective intent and 
objective purpose, you don’t really see what comes to be known as originalism 
as a distinctive ideology until the 1970s and 1980s.  It arises roughly 
simultaneously with the birth of The Federalist Society, and for more or less the 
same reason: both originalism and the early Federalist Society are reactions 
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against what are perceived to be some of the excesses of the Warren Court and 
the early Burger Court. 
In the view of people who then called themselves originalists, the mostly 
liberal Justices were using the Constitution to impose their own values to 
accomplish what they were unable to achieve through the democratic process.  
The core idea of the original originalism was to constrain constitutional 
interpretation and thereby render it more legitimate.  Many of the original 
originalists coupled originalism with an ideology of judicial restraint.  That’s 
another somewhat ambiguous term, so let me add that as I’m using it here, 
judicial restraint means that courts oughtn’t to strike down the outputs of 
legislative and other majoritarian processes unless there’s a very clear answer in 
the Constitution’s text and history.  Long before originalism was a distinctive 
view, the leading advocate of judicial restraint in constitutional interpretation 
was James Bradley Thayer, who wrote a very influential article in the late 
nineteenth century arguing that courts both practiced judicial restraint (which 
was dubious as a descriptive claim) and should practice it, which was a 
normative claim rooted in democratic principles.23  Thayerist justices practicing 
judicial restraint will not invalidate the outputs of majoritarian processes unless 
they’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that that’s what is required. 
But modern originalism is not coupled with judicial restraint.  At some point 
originalists came to reason like this: “As long as we’re being bound by the 
Constitution’s original meaning, we don’t also have to be judicially restrained.  
So we can use the Constitution as a sword, not just as a shield.  We can use 
originalism to strike down laws that we think are unconstitutional as inconsistent 
with the original meaning.”  Cases finding a right to individual ownership and 
possession of firearms, the modern federalism decisions, state sovereign 
immunity, campaign finance are all instances of the Court ostensibly using the 
original understanding to support striking down laws. 
Does originalism entail judicial restraint?  It originally did.  It doesn’t 
anymore. 
Now I want to pose a different question about what originalism entails: 
whether one should look at the original, subjective expectations and intentions 
of the founders, including some combination of the people who attended the 
1787 Philadelphia Convention, those who attended the state ratifying 
conventions, and the general public?  Should we ask what they had in mind with 
respect to concrete cases?  Or, alternatively, should we ask a different question, 
one about what is often called original public meaning?  This alternative 
approach looks at the semantic content of the words of the Constitution rather 
than the subjective intentions and expectations of the drafters, ratifiers, and 
general public. 
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Over the last twenty to thirty years the vast majority of academic originalists 
have shifted from subjective intentions and expectations—”stay off the grass” 
means “don’t smoke the marijuana,” to use Professor Prakash’s example—to 
objective public meaning.  In a moment, I’ll critique original public meaning, 
but first I want to acknowledge that there were good reasons why originalists 
moved from subjective expectations and intentions to public meaning.  I’ll 
discuss four such good reasons for the shift. 
First, as a general matter, we believe that the law should be comprehensible 
to the public and that the law consists of the authoritative utterances of the 
legitimate lawmaking bodies.  The law is the authoritative utterances of the law-
makers, meaning the words, not what the law-makers might have had in their 
heads.  That’s true not just of constitutional interpretation.  It’s true of statutory 
interpretation as well. 
Second, the obligation to focus on the utterances rather than the intentions or 
expectations behind them is especially pressing, given the historical process that 
gave rise to the Constitution.  The Convention met in secret.  We didn’t get 
Madison’s notes until fifty years later.  The Framers quite self-consciously 
adopted a procedure by which we wouldn’t be looking to what they had in mind.  
Rather we look to what was ratified. 
Third, what makes the Constitution law, at least originally, was a process that 
was very wide open in which people had divergent intentions and expectations.  
There were ratifying conventions in each of the states.  There were many 
different people expressing different views.  In order to find something on which 
we can agree, it makes sense to look at original public meaning rather than 
subjective expectations and intentions because you’re more likely to find a 
shared understanding on meaning than you are as to expectations and intentions. 
As an illustration of that phenomenon, just think about some of the questions 
that vexed the early Republic, such as whether the first bank of the United States 
was valid.  This was an issue that divided the Washington administration.  
Hamilton’s position in favor of the bank eventually won, but there were strong 
statements of the contrary positions by Edmund Randolph and by Thomas 
Jefferson.  Yet they all were very familiar with what had just happened.  They 
had different intentions and expectations.  Maybe meaning helps us there.  
Maybe we can find something dispositive at the level of meaning. 
Finally, as Professor Pildes has pointed out, there are contexts in which the 
original intentions and expectations are going to lead to very unpalatable results.  
For example, the people who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
almost certainly did not intend the Equal Protection Clause of its Section One to 
require sex equality.24  We can have confidence in that assessment because they 
expressly included permission for sex discrimination in favor of men with 
respect to voting in Section Two of the very same Fourteenth Amendment. 
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There are other examples of immoral results from associating the 
Constitution’s meaning too closely with the intentions and expectations of its 
framers and ratifiers.  Consider Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott.  He 
says African Americans can’t be citizens because that was the intention, 
understanding, and expectation of virtually everybody who was politically active 
in the late eighteenth century.25  You can escape some of these normative 
problems by moving to original public meaning because original public meaning 
necessarily operates at a much higher level of abstraction.  Indeed, the vagueness 
of meaning is a feature, not a bug.  It’s what enables a consensus to form in favor 
of words even when there is disagreement about what people intend or expect 
from words. 
Thus I agree with the self-styled originalist scholars who pushed away from 
expectations and intentions to original public meaning, because doing so does 
solve some of the core problems with intentions and expectations.  But it does 
so at substantial cost.  The main cost is that the level of generality that one needs 
to go to in order to locate consensus in the late eighteenth century or the post-
Civil War period, if you’re talking about the Reconstruction Amendments, is so 
abstract as to be very substantially underdeterminate in concrete cases.  That’s 
also true of the level of abstraction you need to avoid the sorts of odious results 
that intentions and expectations yield. 
Once you go to that higher level of abstraction, however, originalism becomes 
virtually indistinguishable from living constitutionalism.  This is why Professor 
Jack Balkin was able to write a book with the title Living Originalism, in which 
he argues that originalism and living constitutionalism are opposite sides of the 
same coin.26  Ronald Dworkin said that same thing in a book he wrote in the 
mid-1990s.  He said that if you define originalism simply as what the Framers 
intended to say as opposed to what other intentions and expectations they may 
have had, then originalism is consistent with his view.27 
Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs take the view that originalism 
is already our law, because once you understand that originalism only operates 
at a very high level of abstraction and you see courts not professing to contradict 
the original understanding, you’ve got originalism.28  Yet if the way to save 
originalism is to render it equivalent to living constitutionalism in virtually all 
concrete cases that we really care about, then the answer to the question why or 
why not be an originalist is “who cares?”  That is to say, if we are all originalists 
but originalism is no longer a distinctive position, there’s really nothing at stake. 
I’ll nonetheless conclude by offering one reason why we ought to care.  I think 
that sophisticated audiences, like the people in this room and the people on this 
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panel, understand the difference between original public meaning and original 
intentions and expectations.  And usually when they talk about originalism they 
mean original public meaning, although there are contexts of course, like 
Professor Prakash’s example, where it’s better to be a subjective intentionalist 
originalist.  You want to honor your grandfather’s wishes and not smoke 
marijuana. 
Still, despite that example, the overall the argument for constitutional 
interpretation has generally shifted and, I think, been pretty decisively won by 
the original public meaning originalists.  However, if you look at the public 
discourse, you see something else.  Consider confirmation hearings for Supreme 
Court justices.  Or consider impeachment proceedings about which I’ll say a 
little more during the comments.  In these public settings, you routinely see 
legislators, and even judges and justices, resorting to expectations and 
intentions.  You even see this phenomenon from jurists that you think would 
know better.  In an article I wrote some years ago, I gave examples of Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas talking the talk of original public meaning, but then 
in particular cases using concrete intentions and expectations.29 
Thus one reason why you might not want to call yourself an originalist is that, 
although you may have in mind the legitimate original public meaning version 
that’s equivalent to living constitutionalism, when you make arguments that 
justify originalism, you will thereby license politicians, judges, and justices to 
use the discredited form of originalism.  And of course, we don’t want people to 
be acting dishonestly in that way. 
I’ve got lots more to say, so hopefully someone will ask me during the Q&A, 
“What else were you going to say, Professor Dorf?” 
[Laughter and applause] 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Well, that was terrific.  Why don’t we start 
by giving the panelists an opportunity to respond, if they wish, to anything said 
by their co-panelists?  Judge Barrett, do you want to begin? 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Sure, I will.  I actually think that Professor 
Prakash and I don’t disagree about whether originalism is a theory of 
interpretation or normative theory of justification.  For me, it is both.  My 
position is that, if, for reasons of popular sovereignty, you accept the proposition 
that the Constitution is law, then it follows that the original public meaning of 
the text is law.  I’m also persuaded by the Will Baude and Steve Sachs argument 
that we treat the Constitution’s original meaning as law as a positive matter.30  
(Related to that point, I think Professor Prakash’s example of members of 
Congress invoking original meaning in the impeachment proceedings shows that 
our public officials, not just our courts, treat the Constitution as law.  But I 
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digress.)  The popular sovereignty and positivist arguments are reasons why one 
might say, as I do, that the original meaning of the text is law. 
That said, I agree with Professor Prakash that the normative and interpretive 
aspects can be disaggregated.  In other words, one can believe in originalism as 
a method of interpretation without taking a position on whether the text is law. 
As Professor Prakash said, “Originalism is the natural way to interpret words.”  
That is true whether or not the words are law. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Oh, you want me to follow up?  I also 
agree with Judge Barrett.  And we had a phone call before our talk today.  And 
she said something worth repeating—I don’t know if it made it into your 
comments—but originalism is not about rules versus standard.  It’s not about 
judicial restraint.  It’s not about being against rights.  It’s not about any of those 
things.  It’s a method of interpretation. 
I think Professor Dorf is right that some people may have glommed on to 
originalism originally for those sorts of purposes, but there’s no way that you 
can know ex ante whether the Constitution systematically favors rules versus 
standards or systematically favors judicial restraint.  So I agree with the 
comments that Judge Barrett made in our private conversation. 
[Laughter] 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Which is not very private.  Professor Pildes? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, I was surprised by Sai Prakash’s 
comments because I’m trying to understand what’s at stake if the only question 
is whether originalism is an appropriate method of interpretation, as a matter of 
what seems like literary theory, if you don’t think anything normative follows 
for law once you identify a “correct” method of interpretation.  His approach 
seems, if I understand it, disconnected from the reason we discuss and debate 
these interpretive issues because we’re talking about how the Constitution 
should be interpreted to apply to some of the most charged issues in American 
democracy. 
But if you take Sai’s view that his analysis of originalism as a method of 
reading a text still leaves us completely free to decide what the appropriate 
normative theory of constitutional application is that follows, and that there’s 
nothing about originalism as he analyzes it that dictates anything about that 
question, then I’m left a little surprised about what it is we’re exactly debating 
here and why it matters.  So if you could say more about that, I would appreciate 
it. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Sure.  I think I get nervous when I tell 
people that they have to believe something, and they have to do something, and 
I— 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: —You should be a computer scientist then! 
[Laughter] 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: And I get nervous when people tell me 
that I have to accept the Warren Court’s jurisprudence or Justice Kennedy’s 
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jurisprudence or anyone’s jurisprudence as a matter of law.  So you’re right that 
my claim is narrow.  I think it’s helpfully narrow.  I think if you’re going to tell 
people that they have to believe that the country can’t do X or must do Y, you’ve 
got to have a normative theory.  I think you’re right that some people have a 
normative theory, and you can judge it. 
People who are originalists have given us reasons they believe should compel 
us to follow the original meaning.  I don’t have such a theory because I’m wary 
of telling you what you should or shouldn’t do.  I’m not in the business of telling 
you what you should or shouldn’t do.  So for that reason my claim is more 
narrow.  I agree. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I just want to make two points.  The first one 
continues my earlier remarks but using the example of impeachment.  I think 
that Professor Prakash is exactly right about who will be making what 
arguments, that these arguments will be roughly the inverse of the positions that 
the parties took with respect to the Clinton impeachment, that the votes will 
largely reflect the political priors of the members of the House and the Senate, 
and that what this shows is that arguments about original understanding are not 
determinative, or at least not used in a way that is determinative. 
Yes, originalism is the rhetorical envelope into which people can fit their 
normative priors, but that doesn’t mean that original meaning is actually doing 
the work.  We should distinguish between what people say and their actual 
motivations.  Now you might say, well, it’s understandable that politicians 
would use original meaning simply to justify their priors, but the same thing is 
true of Supreme Court Justices.  The overwhelming empirical evidence we have 
from the political science literature on the Court tells us that the single greatest 
determinant of how Justices vote is their ideological priors.  That’s true whether 
they call themselves originalists, living constitutionalist; whether they follow 
Ely, whether they follow somebody else.  That evidence strongly suggests that 
originalism is merely a rhetorical move.  It’s not a method for deciding cases. 
Now, the way that I think the best originalist scholars deal with the under-
determinacy problem is to use a distinction that Keith Whittington has 
expounded between interpretation, which is what Professor Prakash was talking 
about—just what the words mean—and construction, which allows judges and 
others to fill gaps. 
Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick have a paper that suggests that even in the 
construction zone, judges are at least somewhat constrained.31  I think that’s an 
admirable normative view.  However, I don’t think one sees evidence of such 
constraint in the actual practices of judges and justices.  Thus I end up thinking 
that originalism is not actually doing any real work in the world. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Let me jump in and defend the judges.  If our 
priors are so important, then how do you account for the remarkable number of 
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unanimous opinions on the Supreme Court and even more remarkable number 
of 3-0 panel opinions on the courts of appeals among judges whose priors are so 
different? 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: In many of those cases, the ideological stakes 
are low or very difficult to identify.  In addition, much of the agreement may 
reflect shared values across ideology.  I’m a liberal; most of you in the audience 
are conservative, but we have much in common.  I like you people.  We’re in 
many ways the same.  We went to the same schools.  We send our kids to the 
same schools.  We’re not that different.  You’re part of the same social world.  
There’s not that much difference between libertarians and civil libertarians.  I 
think a lot of the consensus is actually rooted in ideological agreement.  It’s only 
when you have ideological disagreement that I think priors become important. 
And of course, I’m not a nihilist.  I do think law has some constraining force.  
So the question is what’s going to happen where ideology becomes very, very 
highly salient.  And then I just think that there’s no evidence that originalism or 
any other methodology is doing real work. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Just to respond to Professor Dorf’s 
comment about what’s going on with respect to impeachment, I think he’s 
absolutely right, descriptively.  People are going to flip 180 degrees this time 
around.  But it seems to me that’s hypocrisy.  What’s that old statement that 
hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue?  And the virtue is they 
understand that to make sense of the Constitution, you should understand what 
the people writing the Constitution and ratifying it, the ratifiers, what they took 
it to mean, what it would have meant at the time. 
So they’re making the right sort of argument.  They’re just humans.  They do 
what everyone else does.  They try to use arguments in their favor.  The fact that 
none of us are able to perfectly hew to any particular theory doesn’t mean that 
the theory’s wrong.  You might say you shouldn’t lie, or you shouldn’t steal, but 
some people might find themselves in a situation where they have to steal 
because they’re starving.  And I don’t know if that means that the theory is 
wrong.  It just means that people can’t be expected to be perfect, certainly not 
the people in the halls of Congress, with all due respect to the people in the halls 
of Congress. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Professor Pildes, if I took it down right—
he’ll correct me if I didn’t—you indicated that some large domains of our 
constitutional law are neither originalist or, in some cases, are anti-originalist.  
Do any of the panelists, particularly perhaps Judge Barrett or Professor Prakash, 
but also Professor Dorf, would you like to agree or disagree or modify that 
claim? 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I think he’s absolutely right, and he 
gave us various options.  My view is that much of the jurisprudence about 
democracy is not grounded in the Constitution.  I don’t think equi-populous 
districts are required by the Republican Guarantee Clause, unlike Professor 
McConnell.  Remember the Senate is certainly gerrymandered in a sense.  I’m 
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wondering what’s to prevent a litigant, say Eric Holder, going to court and 
saying the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment renders the Senate unconstitutional. 
Now, I heard someone laugh.  But that argument could be made.  And if it’s 
accepted by the Court twenty years from now, enough people might think it’s 
not a bad or silly idea.  My point is that’s just not an originalist reading of the 
Constitution.  The laughter is an artifact of the fact that such an argument hasn’t 
been made and it hasn’t been accepted.  But it could equally made of the Senate, 
just like it was made of the state legislatures. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I would just add that what Professor Pildes says 
is true of the law of democracy is also true of most of the law of the First 
Amendment.  There is pretty good evidence that the First Amendment, as 
originally understood with respect to freedom of speech, implied the Zenger 
principles32 in defamation cases and probably forbade prior restraints.  Maybe 
there’s a good argument that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment, but much of modern First Amendment law, including all of 
the campaign finance regulation doctrine, goes much further than that. 
I’m not going to say that the bulk of modern First Amendment doctrine is 
necessarily anti-originalist, but you can’t derive it from the original 
understanding.  The best you can do is to say that if we understand freedom of 
speech at a suitably high level of generality, then the modern doctrine is 
consistent with it.  That is the second move that Professor Pildes described.  And 
I think that it fairly characterizes a great deal of our modern constitutional law, 
which raises a question for the defenders of originalism: Do you envision 
originalism as a theory of reform—that is, as what the courts and others ought 
to be doing—or as a currently descriptively accurate theory?  That could be a 
question for Judge Barrett and Professor Prakash. 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Well, I won’t give a complete answer to 
your question, but the examples that you gave of the First Amendment are about 
expected applications.  You’re saying that, at the time, people thought that many 
of these things were unconstitutional—but, as you pointed out in your remarks, 
originalists don’t consider the expected applications to be binding.  The 
Constitution lays down some rules, and it lays down some standards.  The First 
Amendment is partly a standard, and people in the founding era may have been 
wrong about how it applied in particular circumstances.  So some of your 
examples might not be inconsistent with the original understanding.  I haven’t 
done the work in those particular areas. 
But I don’t think it makes originalism meaningless to say that, for some things, 
like free speech, the content may be at a high enough level of generality that 
we’re going to disagree about what it requires.  Originalism doesn’t proport to 
give an answer to every question, nor does it hold itself out as making all 
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constitutional questions easy.  I mean, Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed.  So 
I guess I’m there with you.  I will accept that, yes, originalism doesn’t answer 
every question, and it sometimes operates at a high level of generality—but 
those are features of the constitutional text. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I guess I would add, I think, Professor 
Dorf, you mentioned the role that the precedent plays.  And I think Justice Scalia 
understood precedent as sort of an extra non-constitutionally grounded factor 
that he would use to decide cases.  And that certainly suggests there’s something 
more than originalism going on.  And the question is, well, why can’t there be 
still more beyond those two things? 
There are scholars who claim that part of the judicial power included some 
requirement to consider precedent.  John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport and 
I think my colleague Caleb Nelson have written along these lines.33  So there’s 
a dispute amongst originalists about what role precedents should play in 
adjudication.  You’re quite right that if you have the view, as some originalists 
do, that judges should not consider precedent, then judges who consider it aren’t 
being strict originalists. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I want to clarify one point about my remarks.  
I am not defending here what some scholars call living constitutionalism, per se.  
I’m not saying anything about many of the Constitution’s individual rights 
provisions and how they should be interpreted or whether there should be 
unenumerated rights as a general matter.  For purposes of our discussion today, 
I’m trying to resist framing the choice as one between originalism or non-
originalism across the board.  Instead, I am putting forward the more modest 
argument that, at least in some domains, non-originalism plays a role that is not 
broadly challenged.  We have good reasons for being non-originalists in the area 
of “the law of democracy.”  Most of the Court accepts non-originalism in those 
domains.  But that’s not a broad argument for living constitutionalism and a 
rejection of originalism across the board.  I want to carve this down to that 
narrower focus to understand better how originalists respond to the powerful 
non-originalist nature of much of the law of democracy. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Does that mean you’d agree that originalism 
should be, as I think Professor Prakash wrote, the default rule?  But when it does 
violence to the law of democracy, then the judge should move in a different 
direction? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, I’m persuaded by a lot of what 
Professor Dorf says about the difficulty of pinning down exactly what is meant 
by originalism, both among academics and among judges and, to the extent 
there’s a conflict between the two, what choice I would make.  I certainly agree 
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that all judges should take into account the text of the Constitution.  Where the 
text is determinate, it applies. 
No one thinks to litigate the constitutionality of the Senate, for example, even 
though the population disparity between the largest and smallest states today 
vastly exceeds the institution the Framers created.  When the Senate was first 
formed, the disparity in population between the largest and smallest state was 
thirteen to one—and that’s if you count the enslaved people in Virginia who 
were not permitted to vote.  If you actually count people who were eligible to 
vote, the disparity was about six to one between the largest and smallest state.  
Now that population disparity is something like seventy to one, California to 
Wyoming. 
So the institution has changed quite dramatically in terms of the 
representational basis for it.  But even so, no one thinks to bring that case.  No 
one thinks they would win such a case.  Similarly with the Electoral College, I 
find it hard to believe we would adopt that today on a clean slate.  I don’t know 
exactly what we would adopt instead.  But no one’s arguing it’s unconstitutional.  
It’s just not a winning argument and we understand why: it’s written into the 
text of the Constitution itself. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: Let me just say a word about that.  Professor 
Balkin has a useful metaphor for thinking of this.  He talks about arguments that 
are off the wall versus arguments that are, and here he coined a phrase, “on the 
wall.”34  The argument that the Senate is unconstitutional is currently off the 
wall.  But of course, what makes an argument off the wall is not simply the 
semantic content of the constitutional text.  A lot of it is social understanding.  
So it’s not currently off the wall to say that money is legal tender.  That claim 
would have been regarded as off the wall early in the nineteenth century, but 
now the idea that paper money is legal is very much on the wall.  Indeed, a 
challenge to paper money would be off the wall.  How did the shift occur?  It 
was a result of the felt necessities of the times, economic pressures, and all sorts 
of other extra-legal considerations that pushed an argument from being off the 
wall to on the wall. 
However, I want to emphasize again that I’m not a nihilist.  I think that there 
are some words that are so determinate that there will be positions that are 
permanently off the wall.  But a lot of what we now think of as off the wall is 
not off the wall because it’s so much more of a textual stretch than a lot of the 
doctrines we actually have.  And that includes doctrines that conservatives like, 
as well as doctrines that liberals like. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: My aim is not to get the Senate 
declared unconstitutional.  I completely agree with Professor Dorf that, right 
now, that argument’s off the wall.  But if thirty percent of the country comes to 
believe it, in part for instrumental reasons, it’s no longer off the wall.  And let 
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me give you another off the wall argument that’s not off the wall anymore, which 
is that the death penalty is unconstitutional even though the Constitution talks 
about depriving someone of life, liberty, or property.  The notion that the Senate 
is unconstitutional seems inconceivable where we sit now, but a lot of things 
were inconceivable twenty years ago that have come to pass. 
I know that Professor Pildes denies that he favors living constitutionalism.  
That’s fine.  I want to say that I favor, as a policy matter, one person, one vote.  
I’m not saying that I’m against it.  But I’m against the idea that the Constitution 
has to solve all of our problems and that whatever we really feel strongly about 
we have to find within the Constitution.  The Constitution was not a perfect 
document when it was made.  We know that because it basically fostered slavery 
by giving the South more representation in the House and by allowing the South 
to have a disproportionate role in the selection of presidents.  There was the 
Virginia series of presidents because of the three-fifths clause. 
The Constitution is not perfect today.  So it’s quite true that if you’re an 
originalist you have to question or perhaps jettison several Supreme Court 
precedents.  But they’re doing that anyway.  They’ve been doing that for 
hundreds of years.  One final comment I think for Professor Dorf about 
originalism, there’s the word originalism and there’s the concept.  So maybe the 
word was coined in the sixties or seventies.  I don’t really know.  That would be 
an interesting study.  But I think early constitutional jurisprudence was 
originalist in the sense that they did not believe that the meaning of words should 
change over time or the meanings of provisions should change over time. 
I believe my colleague Ted White has said this about the period before the 
progressive era.  And I think that’s an accurate assessment of what was going 
on.  There were differences of opinion about what the Constitution meant.  There 
were serious differences of opinion, but they were still bounded by this notion 
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed.  They were just trying to take 
advantage of whatever ambiguities they saw in it. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I mostly agree with that, although I would point 
out that the original meaning is not playing a determinative role in those cases.  
It is generally thought that the Marshall Court engaged in what Charles Black 
later called structural interpretation.35  A lot of his decisions were controversial.  
What was he doing?  He had a nationalist and, in some sense, Court-empowering 
agenda.  He pursued that agenda while saying that he was just applying the fixed 
meaning of the Constitution because the fixed meaning of the Constitution turns 
out to be very underdeterminate on the questions that are most highly contested. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: So again, I want to resist having these debates 
cast as you are saying, that the Constitution means anything you like because, at 
least with respect to the argument I’m trying to make, there’s a much more 
specific set of issues I’m trying to address.  That issue is how can the outcomes 
of a democratic process be accepted as legitimate—why should courts defer to 
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them—if the democratic process itself is manipulated in such a way by those in 
power to insulate themselves from the kind of political competition that is 
essential to making the process of self government—of free and fair elections—
legitimate? 
When those who temporarily are vested with political power manipulate the 
framework for future elections, it is often difficult for the rest of us to restructure 
that process from the inside precisely because those are the elected officials to 
whom you would have to appeal to end these distortions of democracy.  The 
argument that these manipulations violate fundamental principles of democratic 
self-government under the Constitution is a very specific argument for why non-
originalism in this area is justified—and why we have such a strong body of 
non-originalist constitutional law in this area. 
As I say, Justice Scalia distilled this notion down in a very powerful way, as 
he often did, with that line about the instinct of power being the retention of 
power.36  So I think at least for me, that’s what I’m asking you to think about.  I 
want non-originalists to think about this domain and to ask themselves hard 
questions about how originalism does or should apply in this domain, if at all.  
Do originalists want to follow Judge Bork and abandon all of this law, or do they 
want to find some other accommodation with this body of law, and, if so, what 
the terms of accommodation ought to be. 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: I’ll add one thing.  I think that part of 
Professor Dorf’s objection is that originalism can’t yield determinate answers.  
As I said before, I don’t think that’s what’s on offer.  But that’s true of all 
constitutional theories. There’s always going to be disagreement about what the 
Constitution requires, no matter what interpretive approach you take.  So I don’t 
think that’s a fatal flaw in originalism.  I think that’s just the reality on the 
ground: constitutional law, especially in the set of cases that make it to the 
Supreme Court, involves indeterminacy and some disagreement. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I agree with that, that all the theories on offer 
are vastly underdeterminative.  I do think that, at least in public debate, 
originalism is often sold as much more determinate than it is as part of a rule-of-
law agenda.  So one reason why I don’t want to use the word originalism, 
although I don’t so much object to the concept, is precisely to avoid this kind of 
confusion in public debate about how much work is being done by the theory of 
meaning versus construction and so forth. 
Here’s a possible answer to Professor Pildes’s question, but it is not along the 
dimension of originalism versus non-originalism.  It comes from your colleague 
Jeremy Waldron, who says that the problem with Ely-style representation-
reinforcing judicial review is that it doesn’t have a natural stopping point 
because there are lots of controversial theories about democracy.37  Moreover, 
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Waldron says, courts aren’t necessary to police democracy.  England got rid of 
the rotten boroughs through legislative action.  So, he says, it’s possible to use 
majoritarian processes to cure the majoritarian defects.  Now, maybe the answer 
to Waldron is that possible does not mean certain.  If the system becomes too 
undemocratic, it will be too late for anyone to do anything about it, because by 
then you’ve got the Brownshirts in the streets. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Yes.  And it’s certainly true, as Judge Barrett 
said.  And I would agree with her on this, that most theories on offer of 
constitutional interpretation have—as my colleague from Israel, Professor 
Joseph Weiler, likes to say, every border has its guerrillas.  Every theory has its 
boundary problems.  And that’s certainly true of representation-reinforcing 
approaches to judicial review.  And of course, it could be a danger, too, because 
it can lead courts to do things that they ought not to do in the name of preserving 
the democratic process under the Constitution. 
But, as with all of these theories, we’re faced with a choice.  Do we abandon 
this central role for the Court and just live with distortions like massive 
malapportionment of legislative districts for seventy years, as was the case?  
Based on the belief, or hope, that eventually Congress or some other actor might 
take care of the problem?  I think that’s exactly what Supreme Court thought in 
the 1940s when it stayed out of these issues in the Colegrove v. Green case;38 
England around that time was adopting independent boundary commission to 
draw its district and I think the Court, or at least members like Justice 
Frankfurter, thought the United States might soon do the same.  But then, after 
another twenty years went by with nothing changing, and as these population 
disparities grew greater and greater, even Justices who had not been inclined for 
the Court to get involved finally decided fundamental principles of democratic 
self-government required them to get involved. 
So yes, the barriers to change can be extremely high within the existing 
structure when it’s been manipulated to protect incumbent powers.  Might you 
eventually be able to change it with enough public pressure in some context?  
Yes, if most of politics gets devoted to that.  But I don’t think that that justifies 
those structures.  I don’t think it’s an argument for courts staying out of this 
altogether.  I think that we are better off for the body of law, even though I 
disagree with some of it. 
The question is not adopting some ideal theory of democracy.  It’s saying that 
certain manipulations of democracy that can only be justified by nothing more 
than naked political self-interest, rather than any legitimate public policy 
purpose, become unconstitutional.  That leaves lots of room for different theories 
and different approaches to democracy.  It’s not, of course, imposing one vision.  
It’s saying that certain manipulations are off limits. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: But how do judges know what those 
manipulations are?  Should we know it when we see it? 
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PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, the courts have decided, for example, 
that ballot access laws in presidential elections that require a non-major party 
candidate, like John Anderson back in the 1980 election, to get enough 
signatures to get on the ballot one year before the election—before you even 
know who the major party candidates are—violate the First Amendment because 
they impose an unjustifiable burden on non-party candidates.39  I assume, by the 
way, this same doctrine is going to be the basis for the Court striking down 
California’s effort to require presidential candidates to disclose their tax returns 
in order to be listed on the ballot. 
It’s going to be this same body of law that says ballot access rules can become 
unconstitutional when they impose severe burdens, without adequate 
justification, particularly in presidential election contests.  The Court has been 
explicit in acknowledging that there’s no litmus test for making these 
judgements.  It’s a balancing of burdens and justifications, as in many areas of 
the law.  But there is—over time, we accrue precedents, and later cases work to 
figure out how best to apply those decisions to new contexts.  No one argues this 
is straightforward and mechanical, but it’s what courts do. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: All right.  Let me throw a question from left 
field.  We’ve been talking about methods of interpretation, and obviously 
textualism is a critical part of the originalism discussion.  What do our panelists 
think, if they have thought about it at all, about addressing Professor Prakash’s 
stay off the grass hypothetical by having recourse to corpus linguistics to figure 
out whether grandpa was talking about marijuana or the lawn? 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Well, even corpus linguistics isn’t going to 
answer every question—language, as Professor Prakash pointed out, is a social 
construct and it depends on context.  Modern textualism and modern originalism 
accept that.  So I imagine that if you plug in “stay off the grass” into a corpus 
linguistics database, you may well generate answers that are both “stay off the 
green stuff on the lawn” as well as “stay off of pot.” 
We know which one it is because of the grandfather being a drug addict in the 
1970s.  It was the context of the situation that answered the question.  So I don’t 
think that interpretation, whether we’re talking about statutes or the Constitution, 
is a kind of mechanical exercise where you can look in dictionaries or even a 
corpus linguistics database to generate every answer. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: If you’re going to be an originalist in 
constitutional interpretation or an original textualist in statutory interpretation, 
then corpus linguistics can be helpful, especially for identifying idiomatic usages 
or terms of art.  I do think that one can run away with this approach and that 
often, the game isn’t worth the candle because you go so far deep into the weeds 
that you lose sight of the fact that the language is underdeterminate.  But one 
thing that I think you find if you do this work is that the line between subjective 
                                                 
 39. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802, 805–06 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 30–32 (1968). 
712 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.4:1 
intentions/expectations on one side and meaning on the other gets a little blurred 
because language is a social act, and so it’s often hard to separate meaning from 
intentions.  This is a point Stanley Fish has made in his intentionalist phase that 
the line that I highlighted, that people have drawn between meaning as an 
objective fact about language and subjective intentions and expectations, is not 
necessarily coherent in light of our best theories of language.40 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: We’re going to have final comments from 
our panelists, but I’m going to invite the audience to line up at our two 
microphones.  I do want to give folks a chance for questions.  Go ahead, 
Professor Pildes. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I was just going to say that one of the things 
that we have to be careful of with textualism or corpus linguistics—and I do 
agree it has value—is that, precisely because language is social, it’s used always 
in a particular context.  So you have to know when you see certain words what 
were they being used against.  To make this concrete, let me use this recent 
example from the Constitution.  The Constitution, in the Elections Clause, gives 
the power to the “legislatures” of the states to do various things in the first 
instance, such as regulate the manner of national elections.41 
Now, when the Framers used the word “legislature,” what did that word mean 
to them or the public at the time?  I think it’s pretty clear they were considering 
where to place that power among the other institutional possibilities that existed 
at the time and that they would have had in mind.  They debated whether to give 
this power to Congress or to the states.  And since courts and executives existed 
at the time and were being made part of the structure of government, the word 
“legislature” made clear that it was not courts or the executive who would have 
this power. 
But today we get to a question that simply could not have been posed when 
these terms were written and that no one would have understood themselves to 
be addressing.  The question is, if a state constitution chooses to give the voters 
of he state lawmaking power, through voter-initiated direct democracy, and the 
voters decide that independent districting commissions designating elections 
districts will better serve democracy, does the Elections Clause deny voters the 
power to make this choice?  Must this power always remain in the hands of the 
state legislatures, no matter how corruptly a majority of citizens come to believe 
that power is being used, absent a constitutional amendment.  Or, given the 
context in which the word “legislature” was put into the Elections Clause, is that 
term best understood to mean the lawmaking process a state uses, which in the 
modern era has come to include, in some states, direct democracy? 
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That was the question the Supreme Court faced in the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting,42 where the Court in a sharply divided 5-4 vote held that voters, 
acting as legislators through direct democracy, could determine the “manner” of 
structuring election-district design.  You can look at corpus linguistics all you 
want to decide how “legislature” was used in 1789, but because the social 
context in which that word was used at the time didn’t include the option of 
direct popular lawmaking—that just was not one of the options on the table—
then if corpus linguistics didn’t identify anyone who referred to “legislature” as 
including voter initiatives when voters were part of the lawmaking process of a 
state, then the Framers must have meant to deny voters the power to regulate the 
“manner” of national elections, even though no one gave any thought to a 
question that would have been unintelligible at the time.  I think when we use 
resources like corpus linguistics, we have to be careful to understand the social 
context in which words were used at the time, in order to be faithful to what the 
drafters of language understood themselves to be doing and how the public 
would have understood those words.  That’s true whether you’re an originalist 
or not: words alone need to be understood in the context in which they are being 
used. 
To further illustrate some of the complexity regarding this specific issue, 
states have enacted many laws that regulate the national election process.  And 
as far as I know, when the governor normally has a veto power over ordinary 
legislation, he also has that same veto power over this type of legislation.  The 
governor is part of the lawmaking process, and legislatures have not generally 
even claimed that the governor has no power over state laws that regulate ballot 
access, or the use of absentee ballots, in national elections.  So if you ask what 
has the historical practice been about whether only “the legislature” can play any 
role in regulation of national elections under the Elections Clause, the historical 
practice is that “legislature” has meant the lawmaking process of the state.  I’m 
not arguing which side of this particular debate is right.  I’m identifying a 
concern that even textualists need to be aware of the social context in which 
words were drafted to give them their proper meaning, including when using 
corpus linguistics. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Any final comments before we go to 
questions?  No?  Okay.  Recognizing that the last shall be first, I’m going to start 
with the—I wish I could see.  I think there’s a lady at the microphone there.  
Okay.  Please, your question.  And please, keep your questions as short as you 
can, and let’s do sort of a lightning round here so everyone gets a chance to ask 
their question.  Ma’am? 
QUESTIONER 1: So I first wanted to say thank you for coming to speak to 
current law students like myself.  It’s very helpful in class discussions and 
everything.  But I also wanted to ask about your opinions on the effects of the 
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kind of pro-socialism movement on the sustainability of this originalism 
ideology in the next coming years. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I think Michael’s closest to being appropriate 
for that question. 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: It sounds like a law of democracy kind of 
question to me. 
QUESTIONER 1: It’s a hard question. 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: In America and in other, major established 
democracies, we are facing more populist forms of politics, in versions from 
both the right and the left, that we haven’t experienced through most of our 
history here, or in post-World War II history.  I have no idea how any of these 
forces will play out, which of these forces will prevail, how they’ll get moderated 
if they ever gain power. 
I don’t know how to link those still unfolding developments to originalism in 
constitutional interpretation.  But what I can say is the American system of 
separated powers and staggered elections for the House, the Senate, the 
presidency, makes it very difficult for ideological forces to capture all of 
government unless there’s fairly sustained support over a substantial period of 
time.  So yes, you could imagine all sorts of forces coming to power and putting 
pressure on various constitutional understandings.  But I think we have a pretty 
robust and resilient system, and so I’ll leave it at that. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I’ll take a crack at it.  I’m not a socialist of any 
kind, but first I’d say that the people in the U.S. now who have gained some 
traction call themselves democratic socialists.  That’s supposed to be more like 
Sweden in the 1970s than the Soviet Union at the same time.  And then the 
question is, is that consistent with the Constitution?  In many respects, yes.  In 
Holmes’s phrase, the Constitution does not enact “Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics,”43 so there’s plenty of room to do legislatively things that are quite 
redistributionist. 
There are limits, however.  There is the Takings Clause.  There are various 
other protections for private property.  I think it’s notable that the people now 
calling themselves democratic socialists have not generally said that the 
Constitution requires socialism, which is a view I think we would regard as off 
the wall.  But that view was almost on the wall in the early seventies.  Frank 
Michelman wrote a Harvard Law Review Foreword discussing ways in which 
the Constitution might require redistribution.44  That position now seems like a 
period piece, but there was a possibility of it becoming on the wall.  So I think 
the answer to the broader question of what happens to originalism or 
constitutionalism in an era of democratic socialism is we don’t really know. 
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CHRIS GREEN: Chris Green from Ole Miss.  Two questions, chiefly for 
Professors Pildes and Dorf.  Do we have the oldest currently operational 
constitution in the world?  And what is the object of the Article VI oath? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: We’re the longest continuous constitutional 
democracy with a written constitution.  So the U.K., as Judge Barrett said, of 
course has operated under what they call an unwritten constitution or a set of 
constitutional-like conventions.  But in terms of continuous operation under a 
written constitution, we are. 
CHRIS GREEN: What is the object of the Article VI oath?  When we swear 
to support this Constitution, are we swearing to support the same thing that 
George Washington did, given that Reynolds seems inconsistent with it? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, yes.  We will still have arguments about 
how to interpret and apply that Constitution, as the country always has, but of 
course we’re supporting the same Constitution. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: Yeah. I’m not so sure. 
[Laughter] 
Part of the answer depends on what you think happened during 
Reconstruction.  The amendment processes used to enact the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments were mutually inconsistent with each other and 
arguably inconsistent with Article V.  Bruce Ackerman’s theory is that we 
actually had a quiet revolution at the end of the Civil War.45  There is also a very 
good book by Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton on comparative 
constitutionalism regarding the longevity of constitutions.46  They find that easy-
to-amend constitutions tend to last longer.  The U.S. Constitution is an outlier in 
that it is very difficult to amend but has lasted for a very long time.  Their 
explanation is that flexible interpretation by the Court has enabled substantial 
change without many formal amendments. 
I don’t buy Ackerman’s view.  I would say we have the same Constitution we 
had in 1789, but only in the way that you are the same person you were when 
you were an infant, even though all the atoms in your body are different.  The 
Constitution is like the ship of Theseus.  We replace one plank at a time.  Do we 
have the same ship at the end of the day?  In some sense yes, in another sense 
no.  That’s a very academic answer.  I apologize for that. 
[Laughter] 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Before we get into Heraclitus, never step in 
the same river twice, let’s go to the rear microphone, please. 
JOHN VORPERIAN: John Vorperian, Westchester County, New York.  
Professor Prakash, I enjoyed the illustration, “Keep off the grass.”  May I offer, 
if ever called upon to operate a power plant, “Remember, you can never put too 
much water into a nuclear reactor.” 
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To the panel, I would ask, given the tenor of our political times and the 
divisiveness, the heightened confrontation between left and right, does the 
ascendency of originalism give impetus or the green light to political activists to 
simply seek remedy via constitutional amendment? 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I’m sorry.  Is the question whether we 
can just change the Constitution to do what we want to do?  Is that the question? 
JOHN VORPERIAN: Essentially, in essence, yes, it is.  Does it give political 
activists of both left and right simply go out and seek amendment for their 
particular paradigms? 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I’ll say something.  I think the answer 
is obviously yes.  I think one of the reasons why we have so much amendment 
outside of Article V is because Article V is just too difficult to navigate.  So it 
was an improvement over the Articles of Confederation, which required 
unanimity, but it’s still very hard to amend the Constitution.  We would have 
more formal amendments if the Court didn’t amend the Constitution for us. 
So I would say, given how difficult it is to amend the Constitution, it’s 
understandable in some way that political movements try to channel their 
amendments through the courts.  If you’re going to make it impossible to do 
something via this route, the water’s going to flow in the other direction. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: There is speculation that the Virginia 
legislature is now going to ratify the ERA, which would be enough states to get 
it over the top, assuming you treat the deadline that Congress initially imposed 
and then extended and which then expired as non-operative.  I don’t want to take 
a position on whether the ratification is valid or not.  I do think it’s interesting 
that, if it happens, it will mean the last two amendments were both ratified long 
after they were originally proposed. 
The ERA would be nothing compared to the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 
which was finally ratified in 1992, having been proposed in 1789.  But I think it 
says something about the difficulty of amendment that you can only actually get 
amendments that are controversial in their day long after they’re no longer 
controversial.  And that should lead you to question the utility of the amendment 
process. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Professor Barnett? 
PROF. RANDY BARNETT: Hi, Randy Barnett from Georgetown Law.  I 
want to adjudicate a little bit the disagreement between Professor Prakash and 
Judge Barrett on what originalism is.  I think originalism is a family of theories 
that surrounds two different propositions.  The first is the fixation thesis, which 
is that the meaning of the text of the Constitution is fixed at the time it’s enacted, 
whatever that time may be.  And the originalists disagree about exactly how and 
why it’s fixed.  That’s where you see differences between public meaning, 
original methods, original law.  That’s a disagreement about exactly how it’s 
fixed, but they all agree that it is fixed.  And that’s an empirical question.  If you 
believe it’s fixed, you think that the fixed meaning is empirically discoverable.  
That’s what Professor Prakash was calling interpretation, I think, accurately. 
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But there’s a second part of originalism, which is the constraint principle.  And 
that is that constitutional actors ought to follow or be constrained or be 
influenced in their decisions by the fixed meaning of the Constitution.  And 
that’s not an empirical proposition.  That’s a normative proposition.  And there 
are different reasons why originalists hold the second proposition, popular 
sovereignty, rule of law, natural rights.  There’s different other—
consequentialism—theories for the second proposition as well.  So there’s some 
disagreements there.  And I think that’s Judge Barrett’s view.  So I think that 
these views are ultimately reconcilable if you see that there are two components 
of originalism, not just one. 
The other brief point I wanted to make in response to Michael Dorf, level of 
generality move, is that, in my experience, originalists—there’s a consensus that 
most of the Constitution is relatively determinate: two senators, two houses of 
Congress, presentment, a bunch of other stuff.  Most of the Constitution is really 
quite determinative.  What the move is, is that the stuff we’re interested in, the 
stuff we debate about, that’s the stuff that happens at a high enough level of 
generality to be very underdeterminate or indeterminate.  I think there’s a lot of 
underdeterminacy. 
But I think the more research one does into the more underdeterminate general 
provisions—like the Equal Protections of the Laws Clause or the Due Process 
of the Laws Clause or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause—the more 
research you do, the more determinate it actually becomes.  It’s not as thin a 
meaning as non-originalists both assume and persist in assuming and insist on 
assuming in order to give them more room to run.  But that’s, of course, the 
proof of the pudding of that is in the eating. 
[Applause] 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Do you want to take the first point at all? 
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: I don’t think I really have anything to add.  
Professor Prakash? 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I think Randy’s right.  Most 
originalists favor the original Constitution.  But if you understand the first part 
of Randy’s point, it’s possible to be an originalist who doesn’t like the original 
Constitution as amended.  And there’s nothing wrong with that, to say that.  
Obviously, I like the original Constitution as amended, but I think Randy’s right 
that there’s an interpretational aspect to originalism.  And then there’s a 
normative claim.  But of course, as Randy well knows, people have different 
normative arguments for why we should follow the Constitution. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I would characterize your point as the selection 
bias idea.  That is to say, we don’t see the ways in which the Constitution is 
determinative because there’s a selection bias in contested cases for things that 
are contestable, and that’s especially true as you go up to the U.S. Supreme Court 
level because they’re going to take those cases that are most contestable.  I fully 
agree with that.  That’s why, as I say, I am not a legal nihilist.  I do think that 
law is often quite determinate. 
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Then, on this further question of what do you find when you look at the 
original understanding, I agree as a general matter that it is possible that you will 
discover that the original meaning is determinative on some point as to which 
you thought it was underdeterminative.  However, I don’t see evidence yet of 
any Justices of the Supreme Court who claim to be originalist or originalist lite 
actually doing that.  If you you look at the empirical evidence, you see that 
ideological priors are deciding the concrete cases. 
Now, when I posted that point on my blog a couple years ago, Professor 
Barnett’s colleague, Larry Solum, said that’s because there are no real 
originalists on the Supreme Court.47  That move reminded me of what I used to 
hear from communists in the days when there was communism.  Non-
communists like me would say that every attempt to implement communism, 
whatever one thinks of its ideals in theory, has resulted in totalitarian states that 
trample on basic human rights. 
And then my friends, or the people I was talking to, anyway— 
[Laughter] 
—would say, “Oh, those people aren’t real communists.  They’re not really 
faithful to the writings of Marx and Engels and so forth.  They’ve perverted the 
true ideals of communism.”  It seems to me, at some point, you have to judge a 
theory or an ideology by how it gets used in practice, whether that theory is 
communism or originalism. 
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Just a quick response, I do think that 
judges decide cases against their ideology.  I recall Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
the gay rights case where he said, “I think this is an uncommonly silly law.”48  
He’s quoting another Justice who was saying something similar about another 
law.  So I don’t think it’s the case that judges are just deciding on the basis of 
their personal preferences about the content of the law. 
I don’t think that’s true for the liberal Justices either.  I think they’re often 
deciding cases against their ideological preferences.  I agree that their 
ideological preferences might have some weight in their thinking because, again, 
they’re human.  And you can have a perfect theory, but when you put humanity 
into it, it’s just not going to be implemented perfectly. 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: So Chris Eisgruber, who’s now the president of 
Princeton, wrote a book back—it must have been close to twenty years ago—on 
this question.  One of the things that he says, which I actually think is very 
accurate, is that a lot of the examples of Justices voting against their ideological 
priors are actually not them voting against their ideological priors, because their 
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ideological priors are complex.49  For example, people often talked about Justice 
Scalia voting in favor of criminal defendants in Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause cases, but perhaps that wasn’t Scalia simply following the text and 
original understanding; perhaps Scalia’s ideological priors included criminal 
justice libertarianism. 
I think you see some of that in Justice Gorsuch who is proving to be a worthy 
successor to Justice Scalia on criminal procedure cases.  I like a lot of Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinions in this area.  I think he does a really nice job with them.  But 
I don’t think these are necessarily against type simply because we say he’s a 
conservative.  He’s a certain kind of conservative.  He’s a libertarian 
conservative in certain respects.  That’s a perfectly respectable position, but it 
means that Justice Gorsuch’s votes in favor of the rights of criminal suspects are 
not contrary to his ideological priors. 
But I agree with Professor Prakash that no Justice simply asks in any particular 
case, “What is my first-order normative view about the best policy, and how do 
I implement that in this case?”  Rather, my claim based on the empirical 
literature is that the ideological priors are doing a lot more work than the 
jurisprudential skein in which the Justices  wrap them. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Back microphone. 
QUESTIONER 5: Thank you, your honor.  This is specifically a question for 
Mr. Pildes.  I completely understand the concerns you’ve expressed that the law 
of democracy is necessary in order to assure fair competition for power and that 
there are real problems with the potential entrenchment of those in power to 
avoid any check on their authority.  I can’t help noticing, though, that that body 
of law, as you’ve represented it, ceases the check on that of the judiciary, which 
is, of course, the most entrenched and hardest to check of our branches. 
That seems a bit of a problem especially in an era where, for several decades, 
some judges have seemed to be adherents of judicial supremacy.  So I ask, what 
exactly would be the check on that entrenched power seeking to prevent any 
check on itself? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: So that’s a great question.  And something 
implicit in what I have talked about and certainly implicit in the Court’s 
development of this doctrine is that, in the United States, we do not have—have 
not created, for the most part—institutions that a lot of other democracies have 
to oversee the political process, if you will, or to take on various functions that 
right now we have in the hands of sitting legislators.  Many modern constitutions 
themselves create certain independent institutions to set the ground rules for the 
political process. 
So we are the only country that uses election districts that allows the people 
most self-interested in that process to draw the districts for themselves.  I think, 
as most other countries, as all other countries do, that’s an inherently 
pathological situation.  And you’re going to get what we see.  It’s a very 
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interesting question that fascinates me about why in the United States we have 
been so unable to create various kinds of institutions to take on this role.  And 
we in the United States have this political culture, which I think does go fairly 
deep in our DNA, that is just much more skeptical about creating these sorts of 
independent or maybe bipartisan institutions to oversee parts of the electoral 
process.  If we had more of those institutions, I think you would see courts 
playing less of this role. 
It’s the absence in the U.S. of other institutions that can rein in politically self-
interested manipulations of the democratic process that has generated so much 
pressure on courts to fill this gap, as they have.  We have used the courts in that 
way for a long time now, and the courts will continue to be pressed to play that 
role in the absence of creating other institutions that might more appropriately 
take on those tasks.  But it’s, in the United States, a very difficult matter to get 
people to accept the institutions that you’re talking about. 
QUESTIONER 5: Just to be clear, who would guard us from the guardians? 
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, there’s no answer to that question.  You 
can ask that about any sets of institutions that are designed to create checks and 
balances on other institutions.  It goes all the way down.  There’s no ultimate 
guardian to guard us against the guardians that, in a democratic system, will not 
potentially create similar kinds of risks of the ones that you’re raising.  That’s 
an inescapable problem.  We do the best we can in designing institutions in a 
way that hopefully minimizes that risk and have other institutions that also help 
check and balance those institutions.  But I think that’s the best any system can 
do. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Ilya Shapiro? 
ILYA SHAPIRO: Ilya Shapiro from Cato and it looks like, based on the time, 
I might be the last question, which is somewhat apt because my question is 
orthogonal to the panel’s topic, really.  If this is about why we should be 
originalists, well, that’s great.  Most of us in this room probably already identify 
as originalists, and we’re appreciative of the further support or adjustment to our 
understanding of that.  The law students here, I guess, have the most to gain from 
that kind of perspective.  But wouldn’t this panel be even better placed at an 
ACS convention? 
Because it seems like, to invoke Jack Balkin or, yesterday, Elizabeth Wydra 
of the Constitutional Accountability Center, we’ve long been now, for a decade 
or so, all have been textualists.  Now, we’re sort of all becoming originalists.  
And maybe ten years from now, the battle will be all among competing 
originalists where the word originalist will no longer mean anything, and it’s 
back to what’s the best method of constitutional interpretation or what have you.  
So in the sense, if that comes to pass or to the extent that we’re seeing that trend 
now, which could be reversed, and certainly could be reversed if the balance of 
the courts is reversed, then will that mean a victory for originalism or would it 
mean kind of a, well, we’re back to square one in that originalism means 
whatever you want it to mean? 
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Or as advanced by the new originalists, there’s now competing progressive 
originalists, living originalists, as much as there are original meaning—the sort 
of thing that we had in Heller,50 for example, to use practical purposes where 
we’re all competing on the same battleground, which is healthy in a certain 
sense. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: I’m looking at Professor Dorf because I 
understood you to say that original public meaning has gotten to a level of 
abstraction as to make it somewhat indistinguishable from living 
constitutionalism.  Is that the import to your question? 
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I think, Ilya, the point you make is true of most 
concepts.  To choose a more concrete example, think about the debate in 
the Bakke case between the liberals and the conservatives, putting Justice Powell 
aside for the moment.51  The question that divided them was whether race-based 
affirmative action should be judged under the same strict scrutiny standard as 
applies to conventional race discrimination, or should it be judged under 
intermediate scrutiny?  And the strict scrutiny team won that case. 
But then, twenty years later, the people who lost said, “Well, it’s strict 
scrutiny, but it’s not the same strict scrutiny that you apply in these other cases.”  
Whenever there’s a victory for one side, the other side doesn’t go away.  What 
they do is they regroup and now they make the same kinds of arguments within 
the new framework.  So I think what you described is inevitable if it is true that 
we are all originalists now.  I think that’s probably true of lots of other areas of 
the law, too. 
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Okay.  Great.  I have two tasks remaining as 
the moderator.  The first is to invite you to remain seated.  Apparently, a brief 
video will be played.  I know not what it is, but one will be shown for your 




                                                 
 50. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 51. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
722 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.4:1 
 
